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current work at the seminar Globaliseringsforum, arranged by the Globalisation 
Program at the Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies 12.10.2001. The two other 
authors were invited to comment on the paper that was presented at the seminar by 
Menéndez. 
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Globalization and Internationalization: welfare, work, legitimacy and globalization, at 
the Stein Rokkan Centre for Social Studies at Bergen University Research 
Foundation. This program is designed as a University of Bergen research network, 
and its primary area of activity is the study of changes in welfare and labor market 
institutions as they are played out in the debate on globalization and 
internationalization (see http://129.177.180.14/globalisering/programnotat.pdf). 
Issues of distribution, regulation and fairness are central to the program, which 
incorporates research in sociology, political science, economics, history and 
philosophy. One basic premise for program research is that focusing on welfare and 
labor market institutions can provide important insights into other areas of society 
and that it can also shed light on other globalization issues, such as the status of the 
nation state and conditions for democratic governance. 
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Taxing Europe. The case for European taxes in a 
federal perspective1 
Augstín José Menéndez 
Introduction 
Public finances, was once said, are the nervous system of the political community.2 A 
well-drafted budget speaks clearly to its reader. How much is spent and on what and 
how much is collected and from whom are among the most defining questions in 
politics. 
This paper contains two pleas for reform of the public finances of the European 
Union. Both arguments support the granting of a genuine and significant power to 
tax to the Union. 
The public finances of the European Communities (later Union) have been 
highly contested. Section I of this paper aims at providing a reconstruction of the 
many conflicts which have determined the present shape of the EU budget. Instead 
of the rather extended recit that registers the shifts and changes of the attitudes of 
intergovernmental actors, the reader will find an analysis which focuses on two basic 
questions: (1) Which is the unit of tax payment; (2) Which is the unit of redistribution 
of goods and services? The candidates to be both units are the member states, the 
regions and individual citizens. A full-blown political community tends to target all 
three units. We can consider whether that is the case with the EU. 
These new reading  of facts renders intelligible the two complementary but 
distinctive arguments made in the paper. First, a modest case of reform is presented 
(Section II), aimed at transforming the way in which the European Union is financed, 
but not how much money and on what is spent. The proposal is supported by 
normative and prudential considerations. Financing European public expenditure by 
means of taxes would render more transparent to individuals the benefits and costs of 
the goods and services derived from the Union. And this would allow for a more 
permanent scheme of financing the Union. Second, an ambitious case is argued for 
(Section III); it builds on the modest case, but adds that further redistribution of 
                                        
1 A first version of this paper was presented at the Transatlantic Seminar on Constitutionalism in 
Europe, organised by the Universidade Nova de Lisboa at the Summer School in Arrabida. 
2 This metaphor was coined by Roman lawyers, and reiterated by Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la 
République, (Aalen, Scientia, 1977), p. 855; Edmund Burke Considerations on the French Revolution, 
(New York, P.F. Collier and son, 1909), paragraph 188 and Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and 
James Madison , The Federalist Papers (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1987), p. 212. 
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economic resources across borders should take place, and that the unit of such 
redistribution should not be only member states and regions, but also individuals. 
The supportive arguments are once again both normative and prudential. On the 
basis of the existing degree of economic integration, it is claimed that European 
integration can only be rendered legitimate if not only market-making, but also 
market-redressing norms are adopted and implemented at the European level.3 
Section IV complements the modest and the ambitious cases with some observations 
concerning which concrete taxes should be assigned to the European Union. Among 
the normatively acceptable solutions, one can select those that rank better in 
prudential terms. The cunning of reason can be said to consist in matching normative 
and prudential reasoning. 
Finally, the paper dwells with the relationship between redistribution at the 
European and global levels (Section V). The case for European redistribution 
implicitly assumes that the European Union is not the final level of politics, but an 
intermediate layer between national and global politics. European redistribution fits 
into an argument for cosmopolitan redistribution. It is claimed that such argument is 
not only compatible, but reinforces the case for global redistribution, both  by means 
of producing a theoretical and policy model and by creating a political dynamic in its 
favour.  
How the European Communities have been and are financed  
This section analyses the historical evolution of European public finances.  
The cost of Europe has been met in very different ways all through the six 
decades of European integration. Transformations have been led by changes in the 
perception of what expenditures should be undertaken at the European level. To 
consider two clear examples. The move towards the establishment of the Common 
Agricultural Policy or the Economic and Monetary Union led to a major expansion of 
the action of the Communities, which resulted in an increase in the amount of 
economic resources to be channelled to the European budget. But transformations 
have been caused also by different perceptions of how the money should be 
collected. The Treaties Amendments of 1970 and 1975 aimed at substituting the 
system of national contributions by an autonomous system of own resources of the 
Communities. The endemic insufficiency of resources and the perceived unfairness of 
Value Added Taxation as the major source of European revenue led to a partial return 
to a system of national contributions after 1989. 
                                        
3 As it is argued, the distinction between market-making and market-redressing norms is more 
pedagogical than actually useful when coming to terms with existing policy measures. 
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Such changes have led to different answers to two basic normative questions at 
the core of a system of public finance, namely which should be the unit of 
contribution to public revenue and which should be the unit of redistribution of 
economic resources4. In nation-states, such unit is typically the individual (or the 
household in personal taxes). However, regions are also the relevant units for certain 
purposes, such as cohesion transfers among poor and rich regions. In Europe, the 
resilience of national direct contributions and of regional and national policies leads to 
regions and nation-states as the main units of contribution and redistribution. 
The original provisions 
The original financial provisions of the three European Communities (the European 
Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community and the 
EURATOM) were rather fragmented.  
The Paris Treaty granted a limited power to tax to the High Authority (later to 
become the Commission of all three Communities), reflecting the willingness to set 
such institution as an autonomous guardian of the market of these two raw materials. 
According to Article 49, the High Authority had the power to levy taxes on coal and 
steel production in order to finance the expenses of the Community (and to borrow 
money).  
Expenditure was needed given the fact that the Coal and Steel Community was 
given the mandate to deal with the structural changes in the industries, something 
that was clearly considered would require combining market marking with social 
policy. Until 1997,5 the Coal and Steel Community exerted regularly such power to 
tax, fixing tax bases and rates periodically, in view of its financial needs.  
Articles TEC 200 and 201 (and the companion article 172 of the Euroatom 
Treaty) were quite different. They contemplated national contributions as the 
immediate source of revenue to the Community. However, Article TEC 201 and 
EURATOM 173 envisaged their replacement by a system of own resources once the 
transitional period was over, and the Customs Union and the common market were 
in place.  
In the immediate aftermath of the entry into force of the Treaty, budgeting was 
rather complex. No single budget was established, but a plurality of them coexisted, 
depending on the nature of the expenditure. Revenue was earmarked for specific 
                                        
4 On the relevance of considering which are the units of contribution and redistribution, see 
sections II and III. 
5 The Treaty of Paris expired in 2002. Given the fact that the ECSC was expected to obtain 
revenue from non-tax sources sufficient to cover its expenditures, it was decided to set at 0% 
the rate of the taxes collected by the ECSC. See Décision 2749/2000/ECSC of the Commission, OJ 
L 318 of 16.12.2000, p. 13. 
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purposes and specific ratios of contribution were assigned to each policy expenditure. 
Thus, national contribution rates depended on the nature of expenditure. 
This can be illustrated by considering the ratios to which member states 
contributed to the budget of the Comission (Art. 200, section 1), the Budget of the 
European Social Fund (Article 200, section 2) and the Development Fund6. 
 
Table 1. Some ratios of the original national direct contributions 
 
Country Commission budget Social fund Development fund 
Belgium 7.9 8.8 12 
France 28 32 34.5 
Germany 28 32 34.5 
Italy 28 20 6.9 
Luxembourg 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Netherlands 7.9 7.0 12 
 
A false step towards financial autonomy 
The first major attempt to replace national contributions by direct sources of revenue 
to the Union was undertaken in 1964. The first years of the Community were 
characterised by a relative success in the implementation of the goals of the Customs 
Union and the single market. With the Customs Union to become a reality ahead of 
schedule and President De Gaulle using his leverage to substantiate the Common 
Agricultural Policy, the Commission felt the time was ripe for the development of 
Article TEC 201 and EURATOM 172. A provisional Regulation had been approved in 
January 1962 in order to meet the costs of the implementation of the common 
agricultural policy. Such Regulation had to be renewed each and every year. 
The President of the Commission, Walter Hallstein, supported a move towards 
establishing a more stable Regulation, to be in force until the need of the transitory 
period. As the customs union was about to become a reality, the Commission 
proposed to substitute national contributions for the proceedings of the customs 
duties, thus ensuring the financial autonomy of the Communities. His proposal was 
double. On the revenue side, the proceedings of agricultural levies should be payable 
direct to the Community from 1967, while the payment of industrial import duties to 
the Community should be phased in over some few years. This implied shifting the 
unit of contribution to the cost of Europe from member states to individuals. On the 
budget side, it was argued that it would be necessary to grant the power of the purse to 
the Assembly (later Parliament), weakening the veto position of Member States, even 
                                        
6 This was set up by an Implementing Convention and implemented by Order n. 5 of 2.12.1958 
,OJ 33 of 31.12.58, pp. 681ff. 
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big member states.7 This would have also given further leverage to the European 
Commission, which would have a power of initiative concerning the definition of the 
financial needs of the Communities.8  This would have assimilated the European 
power to tax to national power to tax, even if limited and constrained in view of its 
purpose. That might have signalled a progressive shift in the unit of redistribution 
from member states to individuals. 
Hallstein was an open partisan of using integration through law to «force 
history». The move implied simultaneously enhancing economic integration and 
reforming in structural terms the Community institutions9. 
As it is well-known, this resulted in the Luxembourg crisis, which sidelined the 
transfer of actual power to tax to the Communities and thus avoided dealing with the 
budgeting powers of Parliament10. 
 The real move towards financial autonomy 
The empty chair crisis did not prevent the launch of Common Agricultural Policy, 
but it was determinant of the decision to finance it through direct national 
contributions. 
The mandate of Article TEC 201 to establish a system of own resources of the 
Communities was not reconsidered until 1969. By that time, not only De Gaulle had 
left the French Presidency (in April), but the Customs Union had been completed 
and the need for a certain degree of harmonisation of indirect taxation had become 
an urgent matter, as different levels of indirect taxation and intransparent ways of 
collecting it had become the remaining major distortion to the common market. 
The Hague Summit resulted in the reaffirmation of the principle envisaged in 
Article TEC 201, namely, that the Communities should get autonomous sources of 
revenue. Financial autonomy of the Communities was once again a desirable goal. 
                                        
7  Richard McAllister, From EC to EU, (London, Routledge, 1997), pp. 32ff. 
8 Proposal submitted by the Commission to the Council on 31 March 1965, ‘Financing the 
Common Agricultural Policy’, Bulletin EEC, Supplement 5, (European Commission, 1965), pp. 
2?11. See also Hellen Wallace, Budgetary politics: the finances of the European Communities, (London, 
George Allen and Unwin, 1980), p. 52. 
9 Bino Olivi, L’Europe difficile. Histoire politique de l’integration européenne. (Gallimard, Paris, 2001), pp. 
123ff. 
10 Does Moravcsik take that seriously the empty chair crisis? (Cf. Andrew Moravcsik, Choice for 
Europe, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 196: «It is striking how little of what De Gaulle 
sought he achieved and thus how little the crisis diverted the longer-term evaluation of the 
EC») and p. 184: «In the early 1960s, it was above all Gaullist France that insisted on moving 
beyond long-term contracts, initially favoured by France as less ‘supranational’, to a more 
centralised CAP managed and financed in large part by Brussels-based officials. This involved 
a system of value-added taxation centralised in Brussels, a supranational power of taxation». 
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There was a need of both establishing the «own resources» of the Communities and a 
new budgetary procedure to decide on how the collected money should be spent. 
A first step was taken in 1970. A Treaty amendment established the basis of the 
own resources system11. All customs duties, all agricultural levies and a percentage of  
harmonised VAT base (1%) were to be transferred to the Communities. The 
European Parliament was given a certain major role in the budgetary process.  
In substantive terms, this might look as not very different from Hallstein’s 
proposal. However, in the elapsed time it had become clearer that customs tariffs and 
agricultural levies could not be regarded as a stable source of revenue, as the 
European common market making effort took place in the context of international 
efforts at reducing customs levels. The success of the CAP was also reducing the food 
dependency of the EU, and thus, also the yield of the agricultural levies and duties. 
Moreover, the autonomy of Community institutions was rather curtailed, as financial 
decisions were clearly linked to existing financial commitments. 
The agricultural levies and sugar duties were transferred immediately, while the 
customs duties on trade with third countries were progressively transferred from 
1970 to 1975. This resulted in a progressive phasing out of the direct contributions 
made by Member States.  
The 1975 Treaty amendment reinforced the powers of the European 
Parliament, as it was given the final say on items in the budget defined as non-
compulsory expenditure, the right to reject the budget in its entirety and the sole 
right to discharge the budget. As it had happened in national political processes, the 
Parliament has tried to use such power of the purse to expand its competencies on 
other policy fields, something that resulted in a series of institutional confrontations 
in the 1980s. 
The VAT resource could not be implemented until 1979 as only in that year 
agreement was reached on how the harmonised VAT base was to be calculated. 
Despite the fact that a series of Community directives establish the basic framework 
under which national legislators must establish the VAT, there are still marginal and 
not so marginal differences concerning the tax rates and the tax bases. If the VAT to 
be transferred to the Communities will be calculated as a percentage of the actual 
VAT yield in each member states, those states imposing higher VAT rates and 
granting less exemptions would have to contribute more than those opting for lower 
rates and exempting certain transactions from the VAT base. Thus it was necessary to 
establish an ad hoc and fully harmonised definition of the VAT base for the purpose 
of determining national contributions to the European budget. 
                                        
11 See the conclusions of the Luxembourg Council, 21?22 April 1970. 
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It must be noticed that with the actual implementation of VAT as the third 
resource of the Communities, not only a certain degree of financial autonomy was 
achieved, but also there was a clear shift on the unit of contribution to the cost of 
Europe. Even if not always conscious of it (one can say mostly not conscious of it), 
individual citizens became the contributors to finance European public policies. The 
limited powers of the European Parliament (which was granted only in 1975 a final 
say on non-compulsory expenditure items in the budget) limited the shift of the unit 
of redistribution of the goods and services provided by the Communities. 
The looming crisis: insufficient means, increased ambitions 
The move towards financial autonomy was to prove rather controversial, as the actual 
operation of the system came under severe criticism. First, the system proved to be 
insufficient in practical terms. Autonomy was a fancy word to be contrasted with the 
endemic insufficiency of resources to match the increasing commitments of the 
Communities. More resources might be needed to run the programs that were 
within the scope of action of the Communities (this was highlighted in the 
Commission’s report Financing the Community Budget: The Way ahead). Second, the 
system was perceived not to be fair in distributive terms. Great Britain, to whom 
agricultural policy brought about meagre income, strengthened its arguments for 
getting a rebate. It is rather interesting to notice that the argument revolved around 
two basic hypothesis. One, that member states as such should get a fair pay back for 
the money they contributed (something that was coined in Eurojargon as the juste 
retour). Second, that VAT as a source of revenue was unfair because the less well-off 
members would have to pay a relatively higher share of the cost of Europe. That is so 
for the simple reason that the richer a country, the lessere percentage of national 
income that goes into consumption. The UK was not only successful in getting 
rebates, originally through specially targeted expenditures from the Union budget, 
later on as an actual rebate of the money contributed to the common budget, but also 
in framing the terms in which European public finances will be discussed for the next 
two decades. 
The turning point came in 1988, as the financial crisis of the Communities, 
namely the chronic insufficiency of means to achieve goals, was sorted out by means 
of introducing a fourth own resource, namely, a national contribution calculated 
according to the national GDP. This implied a first reversal of shift towards the 
individual as the unit of contribution to the European budget. The second major 
reversal came in 1993, as it was decided to reduce the revenue obtained through the 
VAT, something which was to be compensated by an increase of the fourth revenue, 
calculated on the basis of the national product.  
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Such shift was quite paradoxically reinforced on the expenditure side by the 
increased means at the disposal of the Delors Commission. The new article TEC 130 
on ‘economic and social cohesion’, introduced at the Single European Act was taken 
by the Delors Commission as a mandate to draft the Report on the Financing of the 
Community Budget. The so-called Delors I was agreed in February 1988, and led to a 
sizeable increase in the resources of the budget, which were to be spent in structural 
policies, which implied to redistribution targeted to the poorest regions. The 
Maastricht Treaty led to the so-called Delors II, which was anticipated by From the 
Single Act to Maastricht and Beyond: The Means to match our ambitions.  The 
Commission proposed a budgetary strategy organised around six categories of 
expenditure. It envisaged a clear increase of redistributive expenditure, through 
further structural expenditure, which included from then on the so-called cohesion 
funds. 
The present system of finance 
The present system of European public finance is the result of the agreement reached 
under the German Presidency in the first semester of 1999. The political agreement 
was translated into a Council Decision in September 200012.  
The Decision establishes transitory arrangements to move from the present 
system, in which Value Added Tax stills account for most of the revenue of the 
Union, to the system to be in force from 2004, in which the fourth resource, namely 
national contributions calculated as a percentage of the Gross National Income (a 
refined variant of the Gross National Product) is to account for most of the active side 
of the European budget. 
The system of own resources keeps on being structured on four main headings: 
1) Agricultural levies and duties 
2) Common Customs Tariffs 
3) A percentage of the Value Added Tax, calculated on the basis of the common 
harmonised basis 
4) Transfers from member states calculated on the basis of the Gross National 
Income. 
The revenue derived from the core own traditional resources, that is, agricultural 
levies and duties and customs tariffs, is reduced. That is so because member states are 
entitled to retain 25% of the yield of such resources on account of collection costs, 
from a mere 10% under the previous arrangements. 
                                        
12 Council Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom on the system of own resources, of 29 September 
2000, OJ L 253 of 07.10.2000, pp. 42ff. 
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Further changes concern the third and fourth chapter of the own resources 
system. The rate to be applied to the harmonised common base of VAT is to be 
reduced from the actual 1% to 0.50% in 2004, with a transitory rate of 0.75% for 2002 
and 2003. The loss of revenue is to be compensated through an increase of the fourth 
resource. Further changes concern the alleviation of the share of the British 
compensation supported by the four net contributors to the European budget, that is, 
Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. 
 
Table 2. VAT: first up, then down you go 
 
YEAR VAT RATE 
1983 1.00 
1984 1.14 
1985 1.40  
1986 1.40  
1987 1.40  
1988 1.40 
1989 1.40 
1990 1.40 
1991 1.40 
1992 1.40 
1993 1.40 
1994 1.40 
1995 1,32 
1996 1,24 
1997 1,16 
1998 1,08 
1999 1.00 
2000 1.00 
2001 1.00 
2002 0.75 
2003 0.75 
2004 0.50 
Source: EC Comission 
 
The European Union obtains a tiny amount of income from the personal tax charged 
on its own personnel.  
According to Article 13, second paragraph of the Protocol on the privileges and 
immunities of the European Communities of 8 April 1965, officials and other 
servants of the Communities shall be «exempt from national taxes on salaries, wages 
and emoluments paid by the Communities». The first paragraph establishes that they 
should be liable to be taxed on such bases by the Communities itself. Regulation 
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260/6813 established the basic framework for the Community income tax. Article 3 
establishes the tax base  and Article 4 determines the tax rates. 
These provisions are not relevant on account of the income obtained. As it has 
been frequently indicated, the Communities have a relatively tiny number of civil 
servants of its own, which explains why the European income tax provides only 0.XX 
% of the yearly revenue of the Union. But such tax is relevant on three accounts. First, 
that the personnel of the Communities is exempted from national tax but not from 
tax at such, and is given a treatment far less benefitial than diplomats in most 
member states. This points to the willingness to avoid any kind of special treatment. 
Second, the introduction of a progressive scale is also relevant, and reinforces the first 
argument. Third, it might be seen as been underlied by a basic principle: those who 
benefit most from the Union should be paying taxes to the Union. In the case of civil 
servants, of Eurocrats, benefit principle can act as determinant of the jurisdiction to 
which the tax should be paid, and at the same time does not preclude that tax liability 
is calculated according to the principle of progressiveness. 
Regarding the European Coal and Steel Community, the Commission decided 
to set the levy rate at 0% from 1998, as the provisions entered in the ECSC balance 
sheet at 31 December 1997 were deemed sufficient to maintain the ECSC's budgetary 
activity at the appropriate level until the expiry of the Treaty. Most of the resources 
therefore derive from the 'net balance' from annual financial operations, in particular 
interest on loans from own resources, investments, reserves and provisions entered in 
the ECSC balance sheet, cancelled commitments and miscellaneous revenue. Finally, 
the provision for financing the operating budget which was set up as a precautionary 
measure in 1997 balances revenue and expenditure in the ECSC budget. 
The Prudent Case: Modesty 
The modest reformer (call her Modesty) argues that it is time to reconsider the 
revenue side of the European Union budget. It assumes as given the present extent 
and shape of expenditure. 14 To pay for such public services and goods, it argues that 
a proper system of own resources of the Union, in the form of taxes decided by and 
payable to the Union, should substitute the present system. The case of Modesty is, 
                                        
13 Regulation (EEC, Euratom, ECSC) No 260/68 of the Council of 29 February 1968 laying down 
the conditions and procedure for applying the tax for the benefit of the European Communities, 
OJ L 56 of 04.03.1968, p. 8. 
14 It does so for the time being. It is neither incompatible with an ambitious reform (on the 
contrary, it can be seen as a necessary step to be taken within a larger framework of reform) 
nor it claims to be ecumenical regarding the shape and extent of the Union’s finance. The 
modest reform might (or might not) spark a debate conducive to the ambitious proposal.  
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therefore, to change the unit of contribution to the European Union budget, from 
member states to individual citizens. 
At the end of the day, all taxes are borne by individuals. However, whether 
taxes are directly aimed at burdening individual ability to pay or not makes a 
difference15.  
This is relatively easy to show in the case of European public finances. As we 
have seen, the argument of fairness has been rather successful in undermining the 
role of VAT as a source of European revenue. VAT was said to be regressive, because 
the less well-off, having a higher propensity to consume, will devote a higher 
proportion of their income to consumption. VAT needed to be progressively replaced 
by a fairer different resource. Even if the argument was applied to the aggregate 
figures of each member state, one could notice that part of its attractiveness was 
associated to the well-known individual regressiveness of VAT, characteristic of most 
sales taxes16. 
As we have seen, the actual fourth resource is a national contribution 
proportional to the aggregate national income. As things stand, this means that 
Germany would pay more and Portugal less, to consider only two cases. However, 
German citizens will pay as Germans, and Portuguese citizens as Portuguese, not as 
better off or less well off citizens, something that does not guarantee that the burden 
will be distributed fairly across European citizens.  
Redressing unfairness at the national level  is no guarantee of redressing it at the 
individual level . German citizens as Germans, no matter their own level of income, will 
have to bear a given tax burden at home in order to pay for German national 
contribution. To the extent that no specific tax is earmarked as the European tax 
within the German  system, the distributional pattern of the additional tax burden 
would depend on the distributional pattern of the German tax system as a whole. This 
might be fairer or less fair than the distributional pattern of VAT. Even if, as we can 
quite safely assume, the distributional pattern might be fairer than that of VAT within 
                                        
15 Of course, one could always argue that exactly the same distributional pattern could be 
achieved by two tax systems, one expressed as a burden on nation-states and the other on 
individuals. This would be rendered easier by the introduction of national taxes earmarked as 
means of collecting the national quota of the European budget. Leaving aside the fact that it is 
clearly easier to target individual ability to pay directly rather than indirectly through national 
contributions, Modesty can still argue that the symbolism of individual direct contributions tilts 
the balance in favour of her argument. I am grateful to Alexander Cappelen for indicating me 
the need of clarifying this point (see his comments). 
16 Sales taxes could be rendered progressive if they are combined with a tax on aggregate 
spending applied at progressive rates. This seems to be the argument made by Edward 
MacCaffery, ‘Real Tax Reform: The case for a progressive consumption tax’, Boston Review, vol, 
25, available at Available at http://bostonreview.mit.edu/BR25.5/mccaffery.html. 
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German taxpayers, this does not mean that the tax can be regarded as fairer in 
European terms. After all, it still can be the case that, given the same level of income, 
a Portuguese citizen will have to contribute less than a German citizen. 
This can be illustrated more clearly with an extreme counterfactual case. 
Imagine that Germany and Portugal have the same aggregate national income, but in 
Germany all income is distributed equally while in Portugal 99% of the income is 
concentrated on the hands of 1% of the population. If the fourth resource is calculated 
by reference to the national level of income, Germany and Portugal will be allocated 
the same burden. If it is calculated on the basis of individual ability to pay, the richer 
1% of the Portuguese population will have to bear a considerable part of the tax 
burden, in the aggregate higher than that of all Germans taxpayers together. 
The sceptical can still argue that such different pattern of paying for Europe is 
part and parcel of legitimate differences across member states. Why should not 
nationals decide which distributional pattern they prefer to pay for Europe? 
Modesty’s counterargument is clear: if the cost of Europe reflects goods and services 
which are European, which benefit all Europeans, then we should consider the 
relevant distributional pattern across Europe. Modesty is ready to substitute the raw 
national income indicator for another one that takes into account disparities in 
purchasing power across Europe. But she insists that the cost of European public 
goods and services should be distributed fairly among Europeans, and that for such a 
purpose, national borders should not matter17. 
Under the heading own resources one finds what are perceived and mostly are 
transfers from national coffers to the Union budget. Modesty argues that this is 
unacceptable on three accounts. First, it hides from the scrutiny of citizens the 
positive and negative effects of Union’s policies. According to her account, this might 
explain a good deal of citizens’ apathy towards the Union, reflected in the poverty of 
debate before and the lower turnout in elections to the European Parliament18. 
Second, the present system reinforces the nation-state and regions (that is, 
collectivities) as the exclusive unit of distributive justice within Europe. This runs 
against the thickening of common interests shared by European citizens and against 
the increasingly felt direct impact of Union policies. Moving towards direct financing 
through taxes will open up for the individual as the proper unit of distributive justice 
                                        
17 This is in line with a basic principle of Community law, namely, the principle of non-
discrimination on the basis of nationality. See Article TEC 12. 
18 If hard-boiled realists argue that people are not that interested in politics, Modesty 
counterargues that they are interested in interesting things. As national politics becomes less 
interesting (perhaps due to the technocratic language of politicians, perhaps due to their lack of 
vision, perhaps due to other reasons), people become less interested. European politics is even 
more remote, their participation seems to them to matter less, therefore they care less.  
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within Europe. Third, the present system of transfers is too rigid, and stands in the 
need of renegotiation every given number of years (according to actual practice, five). 
Moreover, it leads to a negotiation style based on the gains and losses to the concrete 
member state. This results in rigidity and long negotiations. Moving towards a system 
of direct financing through taxes would allow a double proceduralisation. On the one 
hand, it would allow to decide under a limited veil of ignorance. Who will be paying 
what would depend on the economic performance in the future. On the other hand, 
it would render clear that not states, but the better off individuals, those who benefit 
more from the existence of the European Union, would be picking up the bill. This 
would also increase support for the arrangements. 
The Expenditure Side not questioned 
Modesty argues for a radical overhaul of the present revenue side of the European 
budget. It takes as granted that the European Union will keep on having a budget of 
more or less the same size as the present one (around 1,3% of European income). 
Modesty might have some observations to make to Ambition, concerning what kind 
of logic underpins the present expenditure (more specifically, to show that it already 
contains an element of redistribution across borders). But her main plea for reform is 
not to expand or reduce the Union budget, but to increase the legitimacy  and 
expediency of the financing the Union. The way to do that is by means of obtaining 
most of the revenue through the direct collection of taxes at the European level. The 
modest case is, at least in the short run, agnostic towards the level and kind of 
expenditure conducted at the European level. It only insists that direct collection of 
taxes is more correct (in normative and expediency terms) than transfers from national 
treasuries. 
The arguments in favour of taxation 
The modest case boils down to a combination of two general arguments apply 
simultaneously to the European Union.  
The arguments are the following: (1) taxes are by far the best means of 
financing public expenditure; this is so both in normative and prudential terms; (2) 
taxes should be collected by the level of politics which mainly proceeds to turn such 
revenue into a series of public goods and services. 
When applied simultaneously to the European Union, these two arguments call 
for the financing of European expenditure through taxes directly payable to the 
Union. This implies that financing the Union through contributions coming from 
national treasuries is rather inadequate. 
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Normative considerations 
The main argument is that the increased direct impact of European policies and 
actions on individual citizens should come hand in hand with a direct system of 
financing the Union. Democracy does not only call for no taxation without 
representation,19 but also for no expenditure without taxation. Taxes are not only a cost 
to democracy, but also a means to democracy. They ensure knowledge about the 
actual goals of public action, which can then be open to full democratic scrutiny. 
Paying for the Union through taxes collected by the Union is thus to be 
preferred on democratic grounds. Modesty argues that such a move would increase 
the visibility of the pros and cons of the activities of the European Union. This would 
hoist consciousness of the actual depth of the impact of the Union on the lives of 
individuals. The result would be a renewed increase on the European political 
process. In the standard, minimalistic view of democracy, more salience would lead 
to more electoral participation, to a bottom-up push for the constitution of real 
panEuropean political parties, which would argue in terms of cross border issues and 
common interests. In a more deliberative, participative understanding of democracy, 
salience would lead to the interlocking of European public spheres and political 
movements, leading to an increased realisation of the need to feed the European 
political process with democratic input.  
Moving towards a European system of taxes to finance the Union’s budget would 
have the indirect and cunning result of increasing the degree of participation in the 
European level of politics, and thus, increase the quality of European democracy.20 
To this, the sceptic can still argue that member states, not individuals, should be 
the units of contribution to finance the European budget. But, leaving aside the 
argument that we have done it that way, why should this be so? First, the benefits of 
integration are not circumscribed to what is got through the European budget (what 
comes back, so to say). The whole argument of the juste retour is based on a bogus 
analysis of the costs and benefits of European membership. The German economy, to 
put just a clear example, has benefitted considerably from the Common Market. 
                                        
19 Advocates of deliberative or discoursive democracy could actually adapt the motto and 
claim «no taxation without deliberation», meaning a more sophisticated and more open to 
participation tax legislative process. 
20 Modesty is not to be confused with Shyness or Reaction. In her view, the main problem for 
democracy is the actual lack of participation, not the overparticipation of individuals. Modesty 
stands closely, even if critically, with bottom up activists (cf. Carlos Santiago Nino, El 
presidencialismo y la estabilidad política en la Argentina, (Buenos Aires, Centro de Estudios 
Institucionales, 1991), pp. 17?18, against organic intellectuals. The argument that democracy 
enters into crisis through excessive participation is to be found in Michael Crozier, Samuel 
Huntington and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy (NewYork, New York University Press, 
1977). 
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What Germany as a unit obtains from the Union clearly exceeds the services and 
goods directly delivered to German nationals by the Union. If we want to apply 
correctly the principle of juste retour, it would be necessary to include more 
sophisticated statistics. Second, national debates are clearly permeated by the idea 
that there are lossers and gainers as a result of the process of integration. If it would 
be possible to make such transition also in order to device rules for financing the 
Union, it would be possible to erode the purely accountancy and nationalistic 
reference to gains and losses. In such a way, the commutative or benefit analysis would 
be transferred from nation states to individuals, and an opening towards more openly 
redistributive concerns would arise. 
Prudential considerations 
European taxes as a means of financing the Union’s budget is also to be supported on 
prudential grounds. 
Modesty argues that the present system of financing has been characterised by 
a permanent struggle to adapt means to ends. The chronic instability of the system 
was rendered crystal clear by the repeated financial crisis of the 1980s. The agreement 
reached in Fointenebleau in 1988 increased the means at the disposal of the Union, 
but at the price of renouncing much of its financial autonomy. Permanent crisis was 
substituted by periodical crisis, erupting shortly before a new quinquenial financial 
perspective must be negotiated. The increased dependency on the fourth resource, 
namely, the direct transfer calculated as a proportion of an economic indicator that 
refines the Gross National Product, implies a need to establish new arrangements 
every number of years. The increased weight of this new type of national implies, as 
we have said, that the nation-state is the correct union of contribution to the European 
budget. It does not take much ingenuity to push the companion claim that the 
nation-state (or at most, its regions) should be regarded as the adequate unit of 
distributive justice in Europe. One should not be surprised if quinquenial 
negotiations revolve around the adequate correspondence between the national share 
and the national benefits, in the quid pro quo  of the European budget for each 
member state. The double role of the nation-state as unit of distribution of costs and 
benefits leads to a clear stalemate and renders negotiations more difficult. 
Things would be different if the budget would be financed through taxes. On 
the one hand, this would imply shifting the unit of financing from the nation-state to 
individuals. As it has just been argued, this would allow to make it clear that all 
citizens, no matter of which nationality, would be paying for Europe according to 
their ability to pay, measured in specific terms by the concrete tax or taxes collected 
at or on behalf of the Union. As suggested in Section IV, European taxes should be 
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tailored in such a way that it will become intuitive that those who are better off 
and/or are benefiting more directly from the existence of the Union are those who are 
picking up most of the bill. In itself, this would lead to a proceduralisation of the 
debate. When deciding how to pay for Europe, the key question would not be 
whether or not one is a national, but whether or not one does well in economic terms. 
The latter criterion is not only more flexible (in the sense that it is more probable that 
one would not have the same economic capacity all through her life than that one 
would not have the same nationality all through her life), but also more appealing 
when it comes the time to distribute burdens and profits. On the other hand, it 
would render negotiations easier, as negotiators could based their bargaining position 
on their ideological stand instead of their national stand. If the negotiation is framed 
in such terms, the divide should be ideological, not national. 
At the end of the day, Modesty could still face a further counter-argument. It 
would be the following21. It might be true that the common interests of Europeans 
have been thickening and that for many purposes Europe has become a relevant 
community of risks, which requires a companion community of insurance. However, 
it is also the case that this is taking place at a time at which individuals are 
increasingly reluctant to assume collective obligations. The willingness to 
spontaneously comply with tax obligations, even national and local ones, is on the 
decrease. This can be realised by considering the episodes of tax resistance and the 
pervasive rise of the black economy, to refer only two indicators. If that is so, one 
could guess that widespread resistance would be the reaction to a more foreign and 
distant obligation to pay, imposed at the European level. Even if Modesty’s case 
might be right in theory, it might not stand much of a chance in practice. 
Modesty is aware of the reluctance of European citizens to pay any taxes. 
However, her case is not a naïve one. She estimates that the looming tax crisis is a 
legitimacy crisis. Individual citizens are increasingly unsatisfied with the actual 
pattern of distribution of taxes. A complex causal chain has led to a situation in which 
the promise of progressiveness and fairness is not redeemed by actual practice, as 
those obtaining income from mobile economic factors, such as capital, are able to 
place themselves at the margins of the tax system. Some decisions adopted at the 
European level, such as the concrete interpretation given to the free movement of 
capital since the late 1980s, are at the root of the problem. Having said that, Modesty 
claims that the legitimacy crisis will not be overcome by means of simply relying on 
national or local taxation. As will be argued in Section IV, the European level of 
politics is the only one with the actual capacity to tackle the main source of the 
problem. The co-ordination of national tax administrations at the European level 
                                        
21 I am very grateful to Rune Ervik in this point (see his comments). 
  
 
21
would re-empower them to tax those tax bases, such as capital income, that now can 
escape the national taxpayer.  
The tax mix to finance the Union 
Modesty claims that many different combinations of taxes are compatible with her 
argument. She is not especially favourable to this or that tax (or taxes) as the ones to 
be collected by or in the name of the European Union.22 Such question requires 
being debated in detail, but can be distinguished from her present argument, which 
must be settled before.  
Having said that, Modesty shares with Ambition some points concerning the 
main features that European tax(es) should have. The reader will find such 
considerations in section IV of this article. 
The Bold Case: Ambition 
The ambitious reformer (call her Ambition) argues that it is time to reconsider the 
revenue and the expenditure sides of the European Union budget. She sympathises 
with Modesty, but considers that the latter is only willing to go half way. What is 
wrong with the present system of European finances is not only how the money is 
collected, but also the extremely modest amount that is collected and spent.  
Her argument is both normative and prudential. In normative terms, Ambition 
starts by making an immanent argument, namely, the present system of European 
public finance already implies that it is necessary to purchase legitimacy credit to the 
common market through redistribution across borders. We can stand on such 
implicit assumption and just explore where it should lead us. But she does not stop 
there, and produces a second argument that provides the normative reasons to 
underpin such assumption, whether or not one agrees that it is already implicit in 
Union law. She openly argues in favour of the claim that the legitimacy of the 
European project requires more intensive redistribution of economic resources at the 
European level. Moreover, the unit of such redistribution should be not only nation-
states and regions, but also individuals. To pay for such extended set of expenditures, 
it argues that a proper system of own resources of the Union, in the form of taxes 
decided by and payable to the Union, should substitute the present system. Such 
                                        
22 Her scheme does not imply arguing in favour of an independent Tax Agency being created at 
the European level. The tax could be collected and enforced by national tax administrations. 
Modesty can add that, contrary to what is usually assumed, they have become Europeanised 
and will become even more so in the coming future. The implementation of the forthcoming 
directive on the taxation of savings income would render clear that national tax 
administrations are to take care not only of national financial interests, but also of those of all 
Member States.  
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taxes should establish a direct link between citizens and the Union. Those individuals 
who have a sufficient economic capacity should pay for the Union as individuals, not 
as subjects of a given nation-state. Her normative argument is complemented by a 
prudential one, which considers the sources of stability within the European Union. 
On Ambition’s reading of European history, market making has only been successful 
and led to a peaceful coexistence when it has come hand in hand with redistributive 
measures at the same level at which markets were being created. In her analysis, 
redistribution is the price of European civilisation. 
Ambition is conscious of the difficulty of her task. The argument that 
redistribution should take place at the European level is somehow counterintuitive to 
many European citizens,23 used as they are to associate welfare state with nation-state. 
She wants to avoid making her task even harder by making two caveats. First, she 
does not aim at eliminating or getting rid of redistribution at the national level. Her 
aim is to create an interlocking system of redressing inequalities which protects 
national arrangements from pressure and at the same times ensures the overall 
maintenance of equality. Second, her argument in favour of considering the 
individual as one of the units of redistribution within Europe does not aim at 
disregarding other units of redistribution. Regional and cohesion policies aimed at 
guaranteeing a homogeneous level of provision of public goods and services are quite 
compatible with the transfer of economic resources from and to individuals to ensure 
other goods and services. As a matter of fact, such combination is quite frequent 
within member states themselves, both at the regional and municipal level. 
The normative reasons 
 The immanent acceptance of redistribution 
The European Union is already into redistribution. A major share of the actual 
expenditure of the Union goes into policies which have as a clear effect the 
redistribution of economic resources across borders. Ambition accepts that this is not 
the usual terms in which Union policies are analysed, but she claims that this is the 
case. Moreover, that this has been the case not only since regional policies became 
part and parcel of the goals of the Communities, after the accession of the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark, or after the move towards Economic and Monetary 
Union in 1991, which was coupled with a generous provision of cohesion funds to 
Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal, but since the very beginning of European 
integration.  
                                        
23 Ambition is keen to notice that this association is, as a matter of fact, stronger the higher the 
National Gross Product is. She wonders whether citizens internalise the national perspective 
even if it is against their own interest. 
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The Spaak Report already hinted at the fact that the forthcoming Economic 
Community should aim at sorting out the basic economic problems that 
characterised the six, namely, their productivity gap with the United States and the 
lack of technology. Attaining such objectives will not be painless, and would require 
combining market making with social policy. Thus, the need of an investment bank 
(European Investment Bank, which started operations in 1958) to support economic 
development and adjustment, and the need for a Social Fund (started operating in 
1960) aimed at improving the quality of the European labour force. 
Despite what is usually assumed, the Rome Treaty is not exclusively about 
negative integration, but it corresponds to a logic of market-making, within which 
different balances can be struck between different interests and values. The principle 
of non discrimination on the basis of nationality is usually assumed as a concession to 
Italy, which by then had all the prospects of remaining a nation of migrants to other 
member states. The principle of equal pay for equal work between men and women 
is said to have been included out of the fact that French legislation already 
implemented it, and the lack of such norm at the European level would be 
detrimental to French competitiveness, in a way. The European Social Fund, already 
enshrined in the 1957 Treaty, is regarded as a petty side agreement, something which 
extends to the European Investment Bank. These measures are clearly short the mark 
of a proper social policy, and even further from anything coming closer to 
redistribution. However, they clearly contradict the argument that the European 
Communities, later the Union, were to be regarded as a matter of neo-liberal 
economic integration. 
The Common Agricultural Policy, and especially the Agriculture Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund, also corresponds, in a limited sense, to this kind of logic. One needs 
to take into account that at a time at which the percentage of the population which 
engaged into agriculture was still high, lifting the revenue of farmers was a basic part 
of any strategy aimed at social cohesion. The Financial Instrument for Fisheries 
Guidance was established following a similar logic once the Fisheries policies of the 
Communities was developed. 
The first enlargment might be considered as revealing this redistributive 
component of Common Agricultural Policy, to the extent that it was felt necessary to 
find some equivalent measure for those countries (such as the United Kingdom) for 
which the CAP did not play sufficiently this role. Thus, the European Regional 
Development Fund was established in 1975. 
 The Single European Act, which is rightly seen as an essential step in terms of 
building a common market, does also reflect a more nuanced logic, to the extent that 
it incorporates to the Treaty a specific title on «Economic and social cohesion». This is 
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once again a limited concept, not corresponding to a full-blooded redistributive 
policy, but one indicating a different kind of logic at play. 
 The Treaty of Maastricht made of economic and social cohesion an objective 
of both the Communities and the Union. The actual move to Economic and 
Monetary Union reinforced the trend as it resulted in the creation of overtly 
redistributive cohesion funds. 
Moreover, there are specific institutional mechanisms, especially within the 
framework of the Economic and Monetary Union, which imply a further 
Europeanisation of tax policy. 
Let me refer to you three examples of what I am saying.  
On the one hand, Economic and Monetary Union leads to the characterisation 
of national economic policies as a matter of «common concern»24. This is not just a 
rhetorical statement. In the coming years, we will become used to the annual 
publication of «broad policy guidelines» by the Community Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, to use a British expression to design a European office. This year, such 
guidelines were published April, 11, and included the recommendation of «reducing 
the overall tax burden, especially on low-wage labour and to improve the efficiency 
and transparency of tax systems, especially through widening the tax base, reducing 
tax rates and ensuring appropriate enforcement procedures». In the related field of 
public expenditure, the guidelines advice Member States to «achieve budgetary 
positions clearly below the object set in the updated stability and convergence 
programmes». It is quite clear that this is a very ambitious set of recommendations. I 
am not sure that the reduction of the tax burden is a neutral and scientific economic 
truth, and I am even less sure that making income taxes flatter is something which is 
likely to be swallowed by all Member States. But what I wanted was just to indicate 
to you that mechanisms of aligning tax systems are already at work, implicit in the 
practice of setting broad policy guidelines.  
On the other hand, the third stage of Monetary Union, which has been entered 
by a number of Member States, implies the setting up of a Economic and Financial 
Committee, with a plurality of tasks assigned to it, including the keeping under 
review of the financial and economic situation of the Member States25.  
Finally, it has become quite well known that Member States which have joined 
the Economic and Monetary Union shall avoid excessive government deficits. As 
things stand now, if the deficit goes beyond 3% of the national product, the Member 
State will be put under the monitoring of the Council and could be fined26. 
                                        
24 See ex Article TEC 103, now TEC 99. 
25 See Article TEC 114, section 2. 
26 See Article TEC 104, sections 1, 8 and 11. 
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Ambition is eager in finding instances of redistribution. But her claim is not just 
a catalogue, but is based on the actual implications of such a catalogue. First, 
Ambition’s argument cannot be simply defeated by simply arguing that 
redistribution is better left to Member States, that it is not  a competence of the 
Union. The series of redistributive policies that this is not the case. If one challenges 
Ambition on the matter of competence, one should be ready to challenge the present 
policies of redistribution as well. Second, Ambition’s case aims at redistributing, but 
doing it openly, and therefore, better. One can consider the present policies, make 
sense of them, and try to determine which are their underpinning rationales. On the 
basis of which, we can consider whether the present way and extent of redistribution 
complies with what the rationale prescribes.  
The full case for European redistribution 
But Ambition’s argument is not merely immanent, but it is also grounded on critical 
normative reasons. Her argument goes that even if we were not redistributing, we 
should redistribute across borders. And this is so for two main reasons. 
On the one hand, European integration has undergone a qualitative 
transformation through the years. From the Little Europe circumscribed to a limited 
set of economic issues we have gone through several transformations leading to a 
mature political community whose laws affect all European citizens quite directly. To 
the extent that we accept the definition of «political community» as a «union of 
multitude of human beings under laws of rights»,27 the European Union is already a 
political community. This entails that it is a new level of politics, a new level of 
government. Part of its legitimacy derives from its scope, from its prima facie 
legitimacy to deal with issues which have a basically supranational kind of audience. 
But a full legitimacy credit can only be based on the usual sources: participation of 
citizens in the making of the laws, guaranteed substantive outcomes through rights 
protection and foreseeing procedural rights to control the process of implementation 
of the law.28 Given the programmatic definition of the Union as a polity based on the 
four basic freedoms, the case for including mechanisms of redistribution within 
Union law becomes very strong.29  
                                        
27 Immanuel Kant, ‘Practical Philosophy’, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999), p. 
455. The quote is from the section on Public Right of the Metaphysics of Morals. He was defining 
the state, but we should do better to reinterpret this as political community, to avoid the 
immediate association of state with nation-state. For an argument on why the European Union 
is a state in a Kantian sense, see Ferry, La Question de l’état européen,. (Paris, Gallimard, 2000). 
28 This triad is further developed in my Justifying Taxes, (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2001), chapter 6. 
29 Even if legitimation through the protection of substantive rights complements but cannot substitute 
legitimation through participation in the making of the laws, it can be said that the emphasis on rights 
protection should be stronger the less room there is for direct citizen participation in the 
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On the other hand, the bracketing of socio-economic questions from the 
constitutional structure of a political community is acceptable only to the extent that 
there are other means available to ensure the actual fairness of the basic economic 
structure of that society. Redistribution is the actual means to achieve such end. 
Communitarians and neo-liberals argue that a basic degree of economic justice can be 
ensured through an ethical or self-interested commitment of the electorate to 
redistribution. However, this presupposes a type of social stratification and cohesion 
that is not characteristic of the European Union (and, contrary to romantic views, 
hardly any longer of any nation-state).30 Solidarity among strangers should, in my 
view, be the background model of democratic distributive justice. In that context, 
basic rights to solidarity, as the right to a basic income, the right to education, to 
housing or health care are part and parcel of the basic rights that citizens should 
mutually recognise each other. The «emptying» of politics can be avoided by 
proceduralising as much as possible those basic social rights. This recommends 
moving away from the paternalistically tainted provision in kind31 to more 
autonomy-respectful forms of redistribution, such as income transfers.32 
Prudential Reasons: Redistribution as the price of European civilisation 
Ambition is ready to present additional reasons to the normative  case which has just 
been made. Her prudential case for redistribution at the European level is based on 
the argument that redistribution is to be regarded as the price of European 
civilisation.  
The boastful rethorics of competition lawyers is the acquis communitaire. The 
four economic freedoms are said to have been the major glue holding together 
European integration and neutralising centrifugal forces. Ambition is inclined to 
consider a different language when asked to provide prudential reasons for 
redistribution. She has sufficient evidence to claim that for most Europeans the true 
acquis communitaire is the success in establishing developed welfare states across 
Europe. For a while, the process of European integration, even as a purely market-
making exercise, and the process of entrenching the welfare state seemed to mutually 
                                                                                                                   
making of laws. That is not an argument for bread and circus, but for redressing the legitimacy 
deficit as much as possible within the existing structures. 
30 On the conundrum of liberal nationalists approach to distributive justice, see Robert Goodin, 
‘Justice in One Jurisdiction, no more!’, forthcoming in Philosophical Topics, 2002. 
31 But see Frank Michelman, ‘On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 
Harvard Law Review (1969), pp. 7?59.  
32 I am not claiming that the right to basic income, for example, is an all-purpose cure. In my 
mind, it is more promising to have a several layer mechanism of redistribution. For a more 
articulated policy proposal, see Bruce Ackerman and Anne Alstott, The Stakeholder Society, (New 
Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1999). 
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reinforce each other. But tensions became evident from the late 1970s. The weakness 
of social Europe is the result of a lack of sufficient and direct concern with social 
standards at the European level, but it is also the result of a lack of positive programs 
that try to redress inequalities and social problems at a European level. The lack of 
willingness to transfer national competencies on social policy and the insufficiency of 
revenue collected through taxes at the European level are to blame. 
The time has come to neutralise the centripetal force of such tensions by means 
of ensuring social standards and provisions at the European level. Redistribution can 
be regarded as the price of European civilisation. 
Practical Aspects and the cunning of reason 
Normative arguments tend to be accused of naivité. However, nothing prevents 
normative arguments from being cunning. At the end of the day, the best argument 
is not one that fits perfectly into an ideal system of justice, but the one that passes the 
double test  of normative correctness and effectiveness.  
Two of the main obstacles towards the development of an autonomous power 
to tax on the side of European institutions are the following.  
First, Europeans do not perceive clearly the European character of the own 
resources of the Union.The problem can be illustrated by considering the different 
perception of on the one hand agricultural levies and duties and customs duties and 
on the other hand the Value Added Tax. 
As has been argued, the first step towards the establishment of a system of own 
resources of the Union was taken in the Hague Summit of 1969. The goal of 
establishment a Customs Union had been achieved the year before, ahead of 
schedule. Customs duties, next to agricultural levies and duties, were transferred 
from member states to the Union. The transfer will be progressive, starting from 
1971. But most of the revenue, as we have seen, was expected to come from the 
Value Added Tax. A set of directives had established the normative foundations of 
sales taxation within the Communities, to be implemented nationally. The direct goal 
was to eliminate distortions to trade that could endanger the achievement of the goal 
of setting up a common market among the member states. After a long discussion, 
Member States agreed in 1979 on the criteria to be used in order to calculate how 
much of the total amount yielded by the Value Added Tax should be transferred to 
the Union. 
Social perceptions on customs duties adapted very quickly to the transfer of the 
tax from Member States to the Communities. Given the existence of the Customs 
Union, the rationale for transferring the revenue yielded by customs duties to the 
Union is that there are no longer tariff reasons to export directly to each national 
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European market. Exporters and importers can make full use of the economic 
advantage of certain locations as entry points of extra-European goods into the 
Communities. This is what has actually happened. To refer only one example, the 
port of Rotterdam is a major port of entry of goods aimed at being sold in all member 
states. Given the potential dramatic increase in traffic and therefore in customs 
collected, and given that that is the result of the Customs Union, it seems fair that the 
revenue reverts to the Union and is not kept by the Netherlands. This argument 
seems to have worked so well that almost nobody challenges that customs duties and 
agricultural levies are European resources properly speaking. 
The reason for making a percentage of the VAT collected in member states an 
own resource of the Communities was not so different. The tax base of VAT is sales. 
The creation of a common market was said to have not only increased the frequency 
of cross-border economic transactions, but also to have led to a growth of the 
economy as such, which would lead to a higher level of spending. The Value Added 
Tax, as all sale taxes, is based on the argument that the economic transaction reveals 
or betrays the economic ability of the purchaser of the good or service33. Part of such 
economic ability should be traced back to the common market, which was advocated 
in the name of the increased standard of living that it will ensure Europeans, by 
means of ensuring peace (and hence basic security and stability) and by means of 
promoting or increasing economic growth or prosperity. However, this is not how 
things are perceived. The fact that VAT legislation is heavily framed by European 
directives is obscured by the sheer fact that the tax is collected by the member states, 
and as such, it has not become fully internalised that the tax is as European as 
customs duties. Thus, the threat made by Germany, France and Luxembourg of not 
transferring the third resource, the percentage of VAT, when a considerable row 
erupted over the composition of the budget. 
Second, the move away from VAT as the main resource of the Union was made 
on the argument that paying for Europe through VAT was unfair in distributive 
terms. This is an appealing argument, as it is well known that sales taxes, such as VAT 
is, tend to be regressive in distributive terms, that is, the well-off pay a lower 
percentage of their income in sales taxes than the worse off as they have a lower 
propensity to consume their income. However, the argument was combined with a 
                                        
33 This can be clearly seen by considering the rationales of the reduced or zero rates of VAT 
applied in the different member states. A recurrent argument is that the basic nature of the good 
or service implies that even those with a very limited ability to pay could not avoid incurring 
in the expense associated to the good or service in question. To use a clear example, the 
acquisition of basic food products is subject to a 0 rate in some countries, such as the United 
Kingdom. Because even the less well-off members of a society need to buy such basic products, 
buying such products does not necessarily reveal or betray an ability to pay. 
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less evident claim, namely, that the member states, not individuals, should be the 
unit of contribution to finance the cost of Europe. If the only problem was the 
interpersonal regressiveness of VAT, it would be possible to fix it by means of moving 
away from sales to personal taxes as the own resource of the Communities. The 
undermining of Union’s financial autonomy was rendered possible by collapsing into 
a single argument two very different arguments. 
The lessons to be derived are also two. The taxes to be transferred directly to the 
European Union should have two basic qualities. First, they should be easy to 
associate with the benefits or the problemsolving  capacity of the European Union (this 
would render intuitive why the tax is collected at the European level). Second, they 
should be clearly progressive, in the sense of imposing a higher economic burden of 
those who are better off economically. European taxes should be those which clearly 
operationalise the idea that is fairer that those better off pay a higher share of their 
taxes than the lower off (in that sense creates a positive association with the idea of 
the individual, not the member state, as the unit of distributive justice.  
The ideal would be, then, a tax which associates the two; a tax which operates 
according to the benefit and the ability to pay principle; a tax that falls especially on 
those who are doing well thanks to the common market, on those who have gained 
most out of the existence of the Union, or at the least, more evidently. 
This leaves us with several candidates which rank high in both normative and 
prudential terms. Two of them are a tax on savings income and a European personal 
income surtax. 
As it has already been hinted, the income derived from savings has become de 
facto untaxed if the income is obtained in a jurisdiction other than that of residence of 
the taxpayer. This is the result of a series of legal, economic and technological 
changes, among which the globalisation of financial markets and the deep 
deregulation of the movements of capitals within the Union. The member states have 
committed themselves to introduce the buffering mechanisms that would allow 
member states to regain the factual capacity to tax savings income. This would be 
rendered possible by the exchange of tax data among European tax administrations.  
Modesty and Ambition could argue that member states should not tax savings 
income, but transfer the power to tax to the Union. Such a tax would rank high both 
in normative and prudential terms. On the one hand, it would be easy to argue why 
it should be transferred to the Union. As things stand now, most of such income 
accrues to people who are actually making use of the free movement of capital. 
Moreover, financial institutions operate in a European normative framework. The 
benefit principle would make it clear that the tax should be allocated to the Union, 
not to member states. Moreover, in the short run it would be very obvious that if 
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such income can be taxed, it is thanks to the problem-solving capacity of the Union. 
Only by coordinating their efforts at the European level can member states regain 
capacity to actually tax such tax base. On what concerns the ability to pay principle, it 
is well established that the better off one person is, the higher the percentage of 
income it derives from capital. A tax falling upon savings income, even if applied at a 
proportional rate, would be burdening the better off. Moreover, those better off 
would be those who are making full use of the possibilities provided by the economic 
freedoms, in this case the free movement of capital. 
It might be added that such a tax would put a premium on national inequality. 
There is clear evidence that the richest are the ones whose income derives in a higher 
percentage from capital. If capital income becomes a proper basis for taxation of the 
Union, then the richest will pay more. This would put a premium on countries 
allowing higher degrees of inequality, as the further inequality goes, the higher the 
percentage of income obtained through savings. 
Turning to a European personal income surtax. It could be established as an 
additional tax to be paid by those who are obtaining income in more than one 
member state. Such criterion would render it clear why the European Union should 
be receiving the proceedings of the said tax. Its raison d’etre would be that those who 
are able to obtain their income in different member states are making use of one or 
several of the four economic freedoms, and as such, are clearly beneficiaries of the 
existence of the common market. So the tax would comply with the benefit principle 
as a criterion to allocate the competence to tax. Moreover, the surtax could be 
collected at a progressive rate, as personal income taxes are in member states. This 
would ensure that it ranks high in terms of distributive fairness.  
From Europe to the world 
By now, the reader has been presented with Modesty’s and Ambition’s cases for 
granting a genuine (autonomous) power to tax to the European Union. The 
arguments that have been made are both normative and prudential, and claim to be 
mutually self-reinforcing. On the one hand, the basic principle of public finance, no 
expenditure without taxation, aims at guaranteeing a political vigilance and control 
over public institutions. On the other hand, the thickening of the common interests 
and needs of Europeans is said to constitute a justification for the introduction of 
redistributive, market-compensating measures at the European level. Finally, it was 
argued that such arrangements would ease the endemic conflictual nature of the 
present system of financing the Union. By rendering clear that the main unit of 
contribution and redistribution should be the individual citizen, Ambition and 
Modesty offer a different map of the interests at stake. 
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The arguments of Modesty and Ambition have quite concrete implications for 
the institutional design of the European Union. But this paper claims (as it is obvious 
in its title) to indicate how we can move «Towards cosmopolitan redistribution». My 
main claim in that respect is that implementing Ambition’s strategy (and even, but to 
a lesser extent, Prudennce’s) would constitute a major step towards redistribution at a 
global level. In this section, I try to spell out in detail the connection between 
redistribution within the European Union (mainly, but not exclusively, associated with 
the second strategy) and redistribution at a cosmopolitan level . This is done around 
three main arguments, namely, (1) that the legitimacy credit of the European Union 
is partially dependent on the building of a cosmopolitan order; (2) that European 
redistribution implies conceiving of redistribution as a matter of solidarity among 
strangers, an apt model to conceive how redistribution should operate at the global 
level; (3) that the actual implementation of European redistribution leads to the 
testing and experimentation of policy measures to render such redistribution 
effective, including measures to buffer existing national and regional schemes of 
redistribution. 
The European Union can only be fully legitimate if it aims openly at the 
building of a cosmopolitan order 
What the European Union is for seems to be the most contested issue on European 
integration. In general terms, the question is open to a bewildering multitude of 
possible answers. However, this apparently intractable problem can be rendered 
more tractable by leaving aside the question of ultimate ends and starting by 
analysing the conditions of legitimacy of public institutions.  
We can affirm that whatever the purpose of a public institution, it can only be 
justified and accepted if it complies with the criteria of legitimacy. The basic of such 
criteria is that all those affected by a common action norm (typically a legal norm in 
modern societies) should have a say in the deliberation and decision-making previous 
to the fixation of such norm. Such criterion leads to three main sets of legitimacy 
standards, covering the process of making of common actions norms, the substantive 
qualities of such norms and the guarantees concerning their actual implementation34. 
In such a light, the Union must be seen as a new level of politics, that emerges 
as a result of the thickening of the common interests shared by the nationals of the 
different European states and regions. Due to a series of political, economic and 
technological factors, it cannot keep on being assumed that the action of individual 
citizens or the public institutions that act in their name will affect only those same 
                                        
34 See Agustín Menéndez, Complex Democracy and the obligation to obey the law, Working paper 
20/2000, ARENA, University of Oslo. 
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citizens. Two devastating wars were needed to realise the assumption that for many 
purposes, Europeans are in the same boat, in less graphic terms, they have a 
considerable number of common interests that can only be regulated legitimately and 
efficiently by doing it together. Sharing common interests determines the scope 
question of democracy, namely, the level of politics at which issues should be dealt 
with. It serves to allocate competencies, which should then be exercised in 
accordance with the three-folded set of criteria of legitimacy (procedure, substance 
and guaranteed implementation). 
Ambition, and Modesty to a certain extent, have argued for trusting the 
European level of politics with the task of redistributing economic resources across 
borders to ensure the achievement of a certain degree of equality among Europeans. 
The building of Europe ends up with the myth of the self-sufficient nation-state. 
By doing so, it renders difficult, both in practical and normative terms, to pretend 
that politics should stop with this new level of government. Even if it is clear that the 
commonality of interests becomes thinner once one goes beyond the European 
borders, there is a commonality that demands something else that just accepting a 
sort of state of nature. 
If this is so, the case of Modesty and Ambition to redistribute within Europe 
should lead to arguing the case for redistributing beyond European borders. Such a 
case might be weaker, demanding a lower level of commitment towards equality, but 
it would still be a case for global redistribution. 
In short, Europe cannot redeem its full legitimacy credit unless it affirms the 
need of establishing a further, global level of politics, which includes redistribution 
across borders as its task. 
Redistribution at the European level shows that the adequate way of thinking 
about redistribution and modelling it is solidarity among strangers, not ethical 
criteria 
Arguing for redistribution at the European level presupposes a model of how 
solidarity among strangers is to be justified, and of its implications, that is what it 
requires and calls for. This element of transcendence of the nation-state constitutes a 
building block for a model of cosmopolitan redistribution. 
As Ambition made clear, the case for redistribution at the European level builds 
upon the actual practice of nation-states. No matter which are the social perceptions 
about the European welfare state, its actual practice is based on the resident, not the 
citizen, as the unit of contribution and redistribution. Ambition also made it clear 
how the process of market-making renders necessary the adoption of explicit 
measures aimed at redressing the normatively unacceptable consequences of its 
motion. 
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It helps thinking about the criteria that should be used in order to interlock the 
different measures of redistribution 
The first lesson that can be derived from a model of European redistribution is the 
need to establish criteria of allocation of the competence to redistribute. In that 
concrete respect, one can find the use of the benefit principle. The benefit principle 
would guide the allocation of taxes to one or the other jurisdiction. Whether 
corporate taxes should be paid to the Union or the member states, or on which 
percentage they should share the revenue yielded by this tax is something that the 
benefit principle can help to determine. Consider the following line of reasoning. In 
most member states, corporate taxes accrue to the nation-state. The usual argument 
made for justifying such outcome used to be complex, and had to do with normative 
and prudential reasons. Among the former, it was usual to refer to the fact that 
companies operated on the basis of norms that are shared by all the residents within 
the said member state. Even if a company operated locally, the production or delivery 
of goods and services was underpinned by a national legal system and rendered 
feasible by the existence of a common national market and a nationally regulated 
system of finance. Among the prudential ones, one could refer to the risks of 
unleashing a race to the bottom among different regions if they gain the capacity to 
legislate the rates of the corporate tax. After the full implementation of the Customs 
Union and the common market, the community of sharing which underpins the set 
of norms applicable to companies has shifted from the nation-state to the Union. This 
constitutes a prima facie argument for shifting the level at which the tax is collected 
and spent35 If, to just an example, companies constituted in the Netherlands do well 
in the European market, they do so by making use of the possibilities opened up by 
the existence of a common market. Why should the resulting taxes accrue only to the 
Dutch government, and therefore go into the provision of public goods and services 
to Dutch residents? To justify such outcome, it would not suffice to claim that this 
has been the practice. Countervailing reasons should be shown. 
The second lesson concerns the specific or detailed mechanisms which are 
necessary for ensuring the viability of redistributive measures at the European level 
are also needed for ensuring the viability of such measures at a global level. The 
European level might be made to act as a buffer, protecting national welfare systems 
against the pressures coming from global deregulation. Thus, as things stand savings 
income is virtually non taxed if it is generated in a country other than that of 
residence of the saver. The forthcoming directive on the taxation of savings income 
would create a buffer against such kind of pressure by means of establishing the the 
                                        
35 There might be other countervailing reasons that could render advisable to split the tax 
between the Union and member states. 
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principle of exchange of relevant tax data between tax administrations. This is 
required to ensure the fairness of regional, national and European taxes, but it 
constitutes at the same time a building block of an international fair order.  
The third lesson is that the effective establishment of a panEuropean system of 
redistribution will reinforce the case and the feasibility of redistribution at the global 
level. This hypothesis can be confirmed by the fact that, among global powers, the 
European Union is the only polity where civil society has been successful in 
promoting concern about such kind of issues, something reflected in the intimate 
link between fundamental rights and external policy, and also on the increased 
permeation of commercial policy by such standards. 
A system of redistribution of economic resources within the European Union 
must be seen as a first step towards cosmopolitan distributive justice. There are very 
good arguments to aim at redistributing resources at the global level. If borders do 
not matter any more for the purpose of moving goods, services and capital36, they 
should not matter when it is time to redress the legitimacy deficit of market 
arrangements. Justice in One Jurisdiction, no more is an apt normative motto. However, 
intermediate steps are necessary to avoid the feasibility criticisms. Entrenching 
mechanisms of redistributive justice in the European Union would force us to 
confront the same questions as aiming at redistributive justice globally. But the 
European Union is already a political community. No matter how insufficient its 
democratic credentials, they are far superior than  those of the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation and even the United 
Nations. This explains why it is in the process of buffering national welfare systems 
against the pressures of global deregulation. 
European redistribution can be said to constitute a golden bridge towards 
global redistribution. 
 
 
 
  
                                        
36 Although it is usually assumed that there is some kind of similarity between the globalised 
economy  of the beginning of the XXth century and that of the beginning of the present century, 
such similarity is not normatively relevant. The global economy of the 1900s was articulated 
around trade between national units and flows of foreign capital that then produced goods within 
the country of destiny. The global economy of the 2000s is characterised by the actual 
integration of the production and financing of economic activity across the globe. One should 
not romanticise either the liberal policy of free movement of workers in the 1900s. It is true that 
the passport control system, to which modern immigration policies are so closely anchored, 
emerged after the First World War. But it is also true that the absence of controls was matched 
by the almost conspicuous absence of the welfare state as we know it. One has to read together, 
so to say, The Death Ship of B. Traven and The Jungle of Upton Sinclair. 
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Alexander Cappelen: 
 Comments 
First of all, I really enjoyed reading the paper– and my own thinking on these issues 
has greatly benefited from your paper. However, I still have some problems with the 
conceptual analysis, in particular the distinction you make between taxes and 
contributions, and the distinction between different units of contribution or 
distribution, and with the content of the two proposals. I’ll explain briefly explain 
why. 
 
i. First, it is not obvious what the economic or moral difference between 
national contributions and European taxes really consist in. Ultimately also 
the national contributions are paid by taxpayers.  
ii. States can never be the ultimate unit of contribution – individuals always 
are. Thus the distinction between the individual and the nation-state as the 
unit of contribution is confusing.  
iii. Furthermore, we can always replicate any system of taxation with a system 
of national contributions, by letting national variables enter into the 
calculation of the tax burdens. The difference thus seems to be political and 
psychological rather than economic or moral.  
iv. The important point must be how we calculate the individuals’ 
contributions. Should nationality be a variable that is taken into account 
when we calculate what an individual should contribute? 
v. Your answer seems to be NO. Nationality is – according to Modesty — not 
a morally relevant factor when we calculate individual contribution. 
vi. A similar point concerns your distinction between the unit of distribution: 
you ask whether the unit of distribution should be the individual or the 
nation-states. But, essentially it is always the individual who is the unit of 
distribution. Transfers to a nation are meaningless unless they in the end 
are transferred to individuals within that country.  
vii. The important question is whether nationality should be a morally relevant 
factor when we consider how to distribute income between individuals in 
Europe. 
viii. Your answer seems again to be: NO. And the main argument – put forth by 
Ambition — seems to be some version of a mutual benefit theory — 
theories hold that our distributive obligations arise from economic 
cooperation and the thickening of such relationships will therefore reduce 
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the importance of national borders for distributive justice. (You also suggest 
other arguments).  
 
My position 
 
i. I agree with the main normative position in your paper: that we have the 
same distributive obligations towards all Europeans independent of their 
nationality. The moral equality of Europeans can be justified in many 
different ways – how is not important to my argument. 
ii. I do not, however, agree with your conclusion that we should try to 
equalize income at the individual level across Europe.  
iii. My position is that there should be an asymmetry between redistribution at 
the national and the supernational level. Furthermore: we should accept 
inequalities across Europe that we would not accept within each nation-
state.  
iv. This argument is not based on differences in moral obligations, it is based 
on the simple idea that society should eliminate inequalities resulting from 
factors outside the individuals’ control, but should be held responsible for 
inequalities that are a result of factors under their control. 
v. This idea is, as you will recognize, the essence of modern theories of equal 
opportunity or liberal egalitarianism (or factor selective egalitarianism as I 
would have preferred to call it). 
vi. My argument follows from the fact that things that are outside the control 
of an individual as an individual might be under her control as part of 
jurisdiction such as a nation state. We should therefore hold the individuals 
accountable for things internationally that we should indemnify them for 
nationally. 
vii. An example, from the educational system, might be illustrative. Nationally 
we should hold students responsible for their effort in the educational 
system. However, we should not hold them responsible for the structure of 
the education or the resources used. However, internationally we should 
not compensate for such differences since we want to hold the members of 
a democracy accountable for their decisions. If we compensate for 
differences in the educational system that are due to differences in national 
policy we would undermine the whole idea of national autonomy. 
viii. As a result: we should redistribute between countries so as to compensate 
for differences between them that are NOT a result of national policies, but 
we should accept inequalities that are due to differences in national polices. 
This means that it IS justifiable to use nationality as factor in calculating 
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both taxes and transfers. And given that it is justifiable to do this it would 
be perfectly legitimate, even more transparent, to use national 
contributions rather than taxes levied at the European level. And it would 
NOT be justifiable to attempt to eliminate all inequalities between 
Europeans at the individual level.  
ix. You say that European taxation is the price we have to pay for a European 
Civilization. I would say that national contributions are the price we have to 
pay for national autonomy! 
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Rune Ervik:  
Comments 
First I would like to thank Menendez for presenting a very interesting and well-
argued paper on the case for a European power to tax and why this development 
should be seen as a first step towards cosmopolitan redistribution.  
In my commentary I will first depart from Menendez subscription to the view 
of no taxation without deliberation, meaning that all those affected by a common 
action norm should have a say in the decision process of such norms. My first 
comment concerns what I will call the missing voices of reform in your presentation 
 
1. Missing voices: In the presentation of reformers you present two Cases, 
«Modesty» and «Ambition». They share a basic positive view of the EU and 
they see it as desirable to have a society in which market forces are 
balanced through redistributive measures implemented by the political 
community. By framing the reform options in this way including only 
different versions of those favouring a change towards a European power to 
tax, there is no taking into account the role of «the bad guys», i.e. those 
who on different normative grounds oppose the EU as such or oppose any 
increase of taxing and spending power to that level of governance. These 
voices range from those who favour redistribution and equality but see the 
combination of market forces and distant bureaucracy as undermining 
such goals, to those who reject redistributive intervention into what they 
see as fair outcomes of the market. In the «normative universe» set up by 
Menendez there is thus a lack of recognition of normative considerations 
that see reforms in the opposite direction as desirable. Thus, taking 
seriously the democratic or deliberation aspect of a European tax reform 
will not that require an inclusion and consideration of these missing voices 
in your discussion? 
 
2. This brings me to a closely related topic concerning the social and political 
bases of European and cosmopolitan redistribution.  In the paper you present 
the normative and prudent arguments in favour European and 
cosmopolitan redistribution. In order to be institutionalised such norms are 
in need of social and political forces supporting them and struggling to 
install them against opposing forces through the democratic process. There 
is little discussion about who these social and political forces may be and 
whether they are strong enough to counter the opposing forces. It would 
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have been interesting if you could give us your view on this. In your paper 
you hint at one social development which you call «the thickening of the 
common interest and needs for Europeans» which would make the case for 
an institutionalisation of European taxation more viable. Although I agree 
with you in seeing a thickening of common interest, there is also a 
potentially contradictory trend towards a «shrinking» or narrowing of 
common interests and needs, a process in which increased prominence is 
given to individual freedom and choice and less to collective solidarity. 
Signs of such developments are seen both as regards reforms of national tax 
systems as well as in social security institutions. More trust and 
responsibility is given to the individual in coping with different risks and 
correspondingly less responsibility for the public sector. This said to stress 
the openness of the situation regarding how different people evaluate it to 
be one of «thickening of interests» or the opposite.    
 
3. My third point concerns the importance of connecting the basic content of 
national tax reform of the 1980s and 1990s to the ideas of cosmopolitan 
redistribution. This reveals a possible contradiction between the ideas of 
European and global redistribution and the reality of tax reforms. Central 
elements in those tax reforms were base broadening, reduction of tax rates 
and change of taxation towards more indirect taxes. (This is by the way 
very close to the EU recommendation cited on page 19 in your paper). The 
frustration with progressive income taxes was motivated by several factors, 
for instance the combination of formally high progressive rates combined 
with an extensive system of deductions and exclusions undermining the 
trust in the income tax institution. There were and still are discussions on 
the possible negative incentive effects of high tax rates on labour market 
participation and economic growth. Some argue that it is unfair that those 
who contribute the most (the better of) should be punished by higher taxes 
and that as the national economy grow people ought to keep a higher 
proportion of their income at their own disposal. The point is that the 
national discourses and reforms on taxation seem to move away from 
redistributive taxes on labour income towards more taxation of 
consumption. In short the ability to pay principle in taxation may be 
weakened at the national level. In my view this creates an important 
obstacle for the idea of European and global redistributive taxation.  If it is 
correct that those better of are increasingly unwilling to share the burdens 
according to the ability to pay principle of taxation within nation states, 
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then I would like to ask why should they change their view regarding an 
European system of taxation? Or put it differently:  Why should successful 
people see their success as a result of the four freedoms and not rather as a 
result of their own individual effort as they usually will claim?  
 
Finally, different historical experiences as regards legitimacy of the state and 
construction of different types of welfare state are to be found within 
Europe. These welfare states including the structure of tax systems vary in 
their degree to which income redistribution is seen as a goal. Within a 
system of European taxation what kind or direction of harmonisation 
regarding this redistributive goal do you see as preferable and what are the 
implications in terms of total tax level of Europe (adding together EU and 
national tax levels) should it increase, stay the same or be lower than today? 
(The answer on this question is of course relevant for the discussion on 
globalisation and competitiveness). 
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